Introduction
As this introduction develops, economic theory justifi es administrative regulation as a remedy for the failure of labor markets to produce fully compensating wage premiums. The role of regulation is to establish the amount of accident and illness protection that would occur if labor markets operated in a fully effi cient manner.
A Spillover costs
Economics recognizes two types of costs associated with the production of a product. 'Private costs' are the costs paid by a manufacturer that creates and sells a product. The manufacturer, for example, pays for the raw materials necessary to manufacture the product. These costs are 'internal' to the transaction of making and selling the product in the sense that the manufacturer pays for them. Spillover costs, by comparison, include costs associated with the creation of a product paid for by someone other than the manufacturer. That is, they are costs of production that spill over onto someone other than the manufacturer. Thus, when a worker pays for the medical and other expenses that result from a workplace accident, these expenses are spillover costs. The same cost is also known as an 'externality' because it is 'external' to the manufacturer's production function.
For a market to be effi cient, the manufacturer of a product should pay for all 'social costs'. Social costs, which are the total of all of the costs associated with the manufacture of product, include both private and spillover costs. In an effi cient market, if a worker is injured, the manufacturer will pay for the worker's medical and other expenses and include these expenses in the price for which the product is sold. If, however, the manufacturer fails to pay for these expenses, there will be more demand for the product than if it were sold at a higher price that refl ected its social costs. The result is ineffi cient because resources are diverted to the manufacturer and sale of some quantity of product that would not occur if the product were properly priced.
B Wage premiums
Until Coase (1960) , economic theory favored government intervention either in the form of liability or a tax to address spillover costs. The goal was to use government action to force manufacturers to pay for these costs, thereby assuring that the price of products refl ected their true social costs. Coase pointed out that persons who might be injured by the actions of others would negotiate with them once a property rule was established specifying whether the risk creator had the right to proceed with some activity that created spillover costs or those subject to such risks could legally prevent such activity. Absent transaction costs, Coase established that these negotiations would produce the same level of safety as the imposition of liability or a tax. Coase recognized, however, that transaction costs could prevent bargaining from reaching the same effi cient result, in which case government intervention would be justifi ed.
The negotiation over wage premiums creates the type of bargaining that Coase predicted could lead to an effi cient adjustment in spillover costs. Employers that fail to reduce workplace hazards can expect to pay increased labor costs because workers will demand additional compensation for enduring occupational safety and health risks. Assuming that workers are fully informed about job risks, workers will demand a wage premium that compensates them for any inadequacies in the expected cost of an injury or illness not covered by workers' compensation. In addition, the employer may have to pay for the cost of recruitment and training of additional workers to replace those persons who are injured or killed and other related costs. To avoid these expenses, an employer will make safety and health improvements until the cost of additional precautions is more than the expense of paying for wage premiums, workers' compensation and other related costs.
In this manner, labor markets should produce the abatement of some safety and health hazards and workers should be compensated ex ante by wage premiums and ex post by workers' compensation for the risks that remain. If workers are fully compensated for those risks, no government intervention will be required according to economic theory. Furthermore, the payment for fully compensating wage premiums is 'effi cient' in the sense that it eliminates overproduction.
C Regulation and effi ciency
As noted, Coase recognized that government action may be necessary because transaction costs can prevent market adjustments that are fully effi cient. If labor markets fail to produce fully compensating wage premiums for this reason, regulators can address this shortfall by ordering employers to undertake safety and health precautions up to the point where the costs of such improvements exceed their benefi ts. If benefi ts are measured as the value of the improvements to workers, administrative regulation can produce the same investment in safety and health precautions as effi cient labor markets.
In the OSH Act, however, Congress rejected economic theory as the basis for administrative regulation. As discussed in greater detail in Section 3.A, OSHA is authorized to order safety and health protection beyond the point indicated by such a cost-benefi t test. Section 3.C addresses the debate in the literature concerning whether OSHA should be restricted by a cost-benefi t mandate. 
Labor markets
Coasian bargaining over wage premiums off ers the prospect of causing an effi cient adjustment in the level of occupational injuries and diseases as spillover costs. This section discusses the performance of labor markets in producing wage premiums, why such payments probably do not fully compensate workers for their occupational risks, and how government mandates that provide workers with additional information about these risks can improve the performance of labor markets in abating workplace safety and health risks. Viscusi and Aldy (2003) , Viscusi (1983) , and other analyses (listed and described in these two articles) have found empirical evidence of wage premiums. Viscusi (1983) estimates that the average annual wage premium for all job risks in the United States is about $400. Similarly, Robinson (1991) estimates that workers who were exposed to signifi cant risks of occupational injuries received average annual wage premiums of about $300 to $500. This amounts to about a 5 to 8 per cent increase above the earnings of unexposed blue-collar workers. Leeth and Ruser (2003) fi nd evidence of compensating wage diff erentials for fatal and non-fatal injury risk that vary according to gender and race. Although workers receive only modest wage premiums, Viscusi (1993) notes the majority of labor market studies in the United States are consistent with a value of statistical life (VSL) that is between $3.0 million and $7.0 million. As explained below, the VSL concept summarizes what market evidence indicates about the willingness of people to pay for a reduction in the risk that they will be killed or injured. Viscusi and Aldy (2003) report that US labor market data typically show a VSL in the range of $4.0 to $9.0 million, with a median estimate of $7.0 million. By comparison, Mrozek and Taylor (2002) conclude that when best-practise assumptions are used, labor market studies reveal a $2.4 million VSL, with a range of $1.8 to $3.0 million. Viscusi and Aldy (2003) also summarize 20 labor market studies in both developed and developing countries published since 1990.
A Empirical evidence of wage premiums
The VSL concept recognizes that when a group of people expend money to avoid a potentially fatal risk, they are implicitly defi ning a tradeoff between wealth and the probability of death. The ratio of the total amount of money spent to the probability of a fatality is expressed as a dollar value of a fatality, such as a VSL of $7.0 million. The word 'statistical' refers to the fact that people are spending money to reduce the probability of a fatality rather than to avoid the death of some identifi ed person. A wage premium can be thought of as a willingness to pay for a reduction in the risk of a fatality in the sense that a worker gives up the wage premium if she or he moves to a safer job. A small wage premium is the equivalent of a VSL of the order of millions of dollars because wage premiums are paid for relatively small risks. If one worker out of 10 000 workers will die annually from a particular safety risk, a $400 wage premium is the equivalent of a VSL of $4.0 million, as determined by dividing the $400 wage premium by the fatality risk (0.0001). Viscusi and Aldy (2003) explain the methodology used in calculating a VSL, as well as the methodological challenges that this calculation presents.
Although most studies fi nd a correlation between risky work and additional compensation, this conclusion is challenged in Leigh (1991) , Dorman (1996) and Dorman and Hagstrom (1998) . The last two publications object that wage premium studies fail to account for labor market imperfections in the industries being studied. Taking into account these imperfections, Dorman and Hagstrom (1998, p. 133) found no evidence that workers received compensation for the risk of fatal and non-fatal injuries, except for one weak measure of fatality risk, causing them to conclude that their 'results cast doubt on the very existence of compensating diff erentials for workers, union and non-union alike'.
B Adequacy of wage premiums
Despite the existence of wage premiums that imply a signifi cant VSL, it does not follow that workers receive a wage premium that compensates for any inadequacies in the expected cost of an injury or illness not covered by workers' compensation. Analysts have identifi ed fi ve reasons why it is likely that workers do not obtain fully compensating wage premiums.
First, the amount of additional compensation that a worker will seek for hazardous work is a function of the worker's knowledge and understanding of existing risks. Robinson (1991) cites national survey data that 33 to 50 per cent of workers in occupations with high rates of disabling injuries and illnesses reported that they faced no signifi cant safety or health hazards. Carmichael (1986) adds that because the dissemination of safety information in labor markets takes time, workers may lack adequate information when they seek a job. Oi (1974) notes, however, that full information by all workers is not necessary to obtain adequate compensating wages. What is important is that the marginal worker has full information.
Second, in order to bargain for fully compensating wage premiums, workers must be able to discern marginal diff erences in risks between jobs in the same fi rm or between fi rms in the same industry. As Lave (1983) , Dickens (1984) and McGarity and Shapiro (1993) discuss, distinctions among risks are especially diffi cult to make in the context of occupational illness, where huge uncertainties befuddle attempts to predict the precise eff ects of health risks on longevity and the quality of life once a disease has manifested itself.
Third, as Weil and Pyles (2005) and Dorman (1996) discuss, a worker's evaluation of risk may be distorted by the way individuals process risk information. Studies in the psychological literature suggest that people do not process risk information in the rational manner that economic theory assumes. For example, people engage in several forms of 'bounded rationality' which simplify and fi lter risk perceptions. Cognitive dissonance is another factor because it induces people to ignore or alter their perceptions of risk in order to avoid unpleasant confl icts with established beliefs.
Fourth, McGarity and Shapiro (1993) argue that even educated and skilled workers may hesitate to leave dangerous jobs because the hazardous pay is inadequate. Such workers may be hesitant to change jobs because of the loss of health benefi ts, pension rights, and seniority, the expense and disruption of relocation, and the diffi culty of becoming familiar with a new employer. Boden and Jones (1987) hypothesize that these reasons explain the relatively low wage premium received by asbestos installation workers who were familiar with the signifi cant risks that they faced.
Finally, the amount of a wage premium appears to be related to a worker's bargaining power. Robinson (1991) cites data indicating that only poorly educated and low-skilled workers are likely to take dangerous jobs. His calculations reveal that hazardous jobs pay 20 to 30 per cent less than safe employment after taking into account education and skill levels. Because safer employment pays more, Robinson observes that persons with training and education avoid hazardous jobs and such jobs therefore go to minority workers. Viscusi and Aldy (2003) , Boden and Jones (1987) and Viscusi (1979) have found that estimates of wage diff erentials are substantially higher for unionized employees than for non-unionized employees, but Viscusi and Aldy do not attribute this outcome to diff erences in bargaining power. Instead, they hypothesize that it may refl ect the risk preference of marginal workers in non-unionized workplaces who are willing to work for smaller wage premiums. They also suggest that unionized workers may have better information about job risks supplied by their unions. Finally, Viscusi and Aldy (2003, p. 43) hypothesize that because workplace safety is a type of a public good, it will 'suff er the common under-provision associated with such goods due to free-riding'. Collective action by labor unions results in higher wage premiums because it overcomes such free-riding. Dorman (1996) proposes that game theory be used to study the relationship of workers and employers concerning issues such as risk compensation. He argues that because game theory accounts for strategic behavior, it can clarify how cooperation and confl ict inside a corporation impacts issues of public policy such as the protection of workers.
C Reform
As mentioned, workers may be constrained in obtaining fully compensating wage premiums for workplace safety and health risks because of the lack of information. Regulatory policies that increase workers' access to risk information should therefore improve market performance.
OSHA's hazardous communication standard is a good example of this type of government mandate. The standard requires chemical manufacturers and importers to evaluate the hazards of the chemicals they produce or import and to prepare labels and material safety data sheets (MSDSs) to convey the hazard information to their customers. It further requires employers with hazardous chemicals in their workplaces to make these labels and MSDSs available to their exposed workers and to train them to handle the chemicals appropriately. Carle (1988) proposes improvements in OSHA's standard, while Viscusi (1983) proposes additional regulation. Viscusi recommends that employers be required to apprise workers of the nature of the risks that they face, the risk level of the fi rm (death, injury and illness rates), its relative risk as compared to other fi rms in the industry, and other relevant risk information. Lambert (2004) would go further and substitute an information approach for OSHA standard-setting on the ground that it would lead to more effi cient regulatory results.
Regulation
Economic theory, as noted earlier, justifi es administrative regulation when labor markets fail to produce fully compensating wage premiums. This section will describe OSHA's mandate, discuss the empirical evidence on whether regulation is eff ective in reducing occupational safety and health risks, and consider confl icting interpretations of this evidence. This section also describes proposals to make regulation more eff ective by reform of standard-setting and enforcement. The discussion of standard-setting reform discusses whether OSHA regulation should be the subject of a cost-benefi t test.
McGarity and Shapiro (1993) and Mendeloff (1980 Mendeloff ( , 1988 generally summarize and evaluate OSHA's role in promoting workplace safety and health. Wilson (1985) and Kelman (1981) compare OSHA regulation to administrative regulation in Great Britain and Sweden respectively. Lanoie (1992a Lanoie ( , 1992b analyzed the impact of occupational safety and health regulation in Canada.
A OSHA's mandate
The purpose of the OSH Act is 'to assure as far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions' (29 USC §651). Among its other provisions, the Act requires employers to comply with health and safety standards promulgated by OSHA. Any such standard must establish conditions and practices that are 'reasonably necessary or appropriate' to provide 'safe or healthful employment' (29 USC §652 (8)). In addition, any standard that concerns toxic materials or harmful physical agents must be established in a way that 'most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suff er material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with in such standard for the period of his working life' (29 USC §655(b) (5)). States have the option to accept federal regulation of employers or to administer their own safety and health regulations subject to OSHA's approval and supervision.
In American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan (1981) , the Supreme Court held that the feasibility mandate for health standards precludes the use of a cost-benefi t test for such standards. According to lower court decisions, a standard is feasible when it is technologically achievable and when employers can aff ord the cost of implementing it. A standard is not economically infeasible because it is fi nancially burdensome or even because it threatens the survival of some fi rms in an industry.
The Supreme Court has not determined to date whether the OSH Act mandates a cost-benefi t test for safety standards. These standards are subject to the edict in §652(8) that they be 'reasonably necessary or appropriate' to provide safe employment, which suggests to some interpreters that OSHA must meet a cost-benefi t test. No lower federal court, however, has interpreted the Act to establish such a requirement.
B Empirical evidence of eff ectiveness
Analysts have attempted to confi rm that OSHA's activities have led to an improvement in workplace safety using a variety of approaches. These eff orts have produced inconsistent results.
First, some studies project the trend of pre-OSHA injury rates and compare the projected results with the actual results. When Smith (1976) , for example, compared actual injury rates in several high-hazard industries that OSHA had targeted for enforcement with projected injury rates, the actual rates were not signifi cantly lower than projected rates. Mendeloff (1980) , by comparison, found that actual injury rates were signifi cantly lower than the projected rates for several individual types of injuries in California. His study, however, found no diff erence between actual and projected aggregate injury rates for California and for the nation. Curington (1986) likewise found mixed results. The frequency rate for all injuries in manufacturing industries in New York was no lower than the projected rate for such injuries, but there were reductions in injuries resulting from being struck by a machine (43.6 per cent) and in the severity of all injuries (13.2 per cent). More recently, Lipscomb et al. (2003) , using workers' compensation data, found a 20 per cent reduction in the rate of falls among union carpenters after the state of Washington promulgated its vertical fall arrest standard for the construction industry as compared to the projected rate of injuries.
The state of Washington is one of the states that run their own occupational safety and heath program under OSHA supervision. Bradbury (2006) fi nds that states that run their own OSHA programs experience fewer fatalities than states that utilize federal enforcement. He estimates that switching to a state-run program would save approximately 46 statistical lives in a year in the average state with federal enforcement.
Second, other studies have tested the correlation between aggregate industry-level injury rates and OSHA inspection activity.When Viscusi (1992) asked whether injury rates were aff ected by the frequency of OSHA inspections and penalties, he found that OSHA caused a 1.5 to 3.6 per cent decrease in the lost workday rate. The 'lost workday rate' measures the number of days of work that an employee misses after an injury. Viscusi indicates that his earlier studies and earlier studies by others found no measurable correlation between the number of OSHA inspections and injury rates.
Third, still other studies have sought a correlation between individual plant-level injury data and an employer's inspection experience. Gray and Scholz (1993) found that an inspection imposing a penalty reduced injuries by 22 per cent and lost workdays by 20 per cent in the following three years. Using the same methodology, Cooke and Gautschi (1981) , Robertson and Keeve (1983) and Scholz and Gray (1990) found similar impacts, but Smith (1979 ), McCaff rey (1983 and Ruser and Smith (1991) found no association using a diff erent testing technique. Gray and Mendeloff (2005) found a decline in the measured impact of OSHA inspections on injury rates. They estimate an OSHA inspection imposing a penalty reduced lost-day injuries about 19 per cent from 1979 to 1985, 11 per cent from 1987 to 1991, and a statistically insignifi cant 1 per cent in 1992-8.
Fourth, Baggs et al. (2003) , who studied fi rms in the state of Washington, found that enforcement inspections at fi xed worksites were correlated with a 25 per cent greater decline in compensable workers' compensation claims than at fi xed worksites with no inspection activity. The authors conclude that their fi ndings lend support to the view expressed in Gray and Scholz (1993) that enforcement visits may trigger a reshuffl ing of managerial priorities and a greater attention paid to safety and health improvements in a worksite.
Finally, other analysts have measured the relationship between OSHA inspection activity and compliance with OSHA safety regulations. Weil (2001) , who studied compliance performance among the largest construction contractors in the country from 1987 to 1993, found OSHA inspections increased the probability of compliance by 6.3 per cent between the fi rst and second inspection and by smaller probabilities for subsequent inspections. He cautions, however, that the results of the study refl ect previous OSHA inspection activity and the high rate of previous compliance. Gray and Jones (1991a) found a signifi cant relationship between OSHA enforcement and compliance at individual plants. Bartel and Thomas (1985) also found that OSHA enforcement signifi cantly increased compliance (by a total of 26 per cent relative to no enforcement), but they found only a weak link between compliance and injury rates. Only a few analysts have attempted to confi rm that OSHA's activities have led to an improvement in workplace health. Gray and Jones (1991b) found that OSHA inspections reduced the exposure of workers to hazardous substances and increased compliance with health regulations. Bartel and Thomas (1985) explain there are two confl icting explanations for the lack of stronger empirical evidence that OSHA activity results in fewer workplace accidents and injuries. The 'ineffi cacy' explanation proposes that administrative regulation is unable to address many of the causes of workplace accidents. The 'non-compliance' explanation proposes that OSHA lacks the resources to undertake eff ective enforcement. In addition, Mendeloff (1988) off ers a theory for the lack of eff ective regulation of health risks.
C Adequacy of administrative regulation

(i) The ineffi cacy theory
The ineffi cacy theory posits that administrative regulation does not increase workplace safety because there is a tenuous link between regulation and the causes of accidents. Administrative regulation focuses on making workplace equipment safer to use. Some analysts argue, however, that the cause of most accidents is a complex interaction of labor, equipment and workplace environment. In light of this mismatch, Barcow (1980) predicted that OSHA may be incapable of preventing more than 25 per cent of all workplace accidents. In addition, Rea (1981) hypothesizes that moral hazard may reduce the level of safety because workers will attempt to substitute higher wages for safer jobs. Thomas (1985, 1987) ask why Congress has failed to reform or even eliminate OSHA in light of its apparent ineffi cacy. Their answer is that OSHA regulations give large fi rms a competitive advantage over their smaller rivals because the smaller fi rms are less able to aff ord expensive regulations. Fuess and Lowenstein (1990) off er similar evidence for coal mine regulation. Their study fi nds the imposition of expensive engineering controls shifted production to large mines by driving smaller, less safe mines out of business. Hughes et al. (1986) , however, were unable to establish that OSHA's cotton dust standard permitted large fi rms to gain in profi tability at the expense of smaller producers.
In light of the evidence that OSHA regulation is ineff ective, Miller (1984) asks whether organized labor is rational in its support of OSHA. He off ers some empirical support for the proposition that engineering controls may increase the demand for labor.
(ii) Non-compliance theory The non-compliance theory proposes that OSHA lacks suffi cient resources to enforce its standards eff ectively. This theory assumes, as discussed in additional detail in Section 3.D.(i), that employers will choose whether to comply or not with OSHA standards based on the probability of detection and the expected level of assessed penalties in the event that violations are detected. McGarity and Shapiro (1996) point out that the industries with the most signifi cant decline in injuries and fatalities are the industries with the highest levels of enforcement. They attribute OSHA's limited impact on aggregate injury rates to the fact that the agency's limited resources do not permit it to inspect the vast majority of employers that it regulates. Weil and Pyles (2005) note that the annual probability is well below 0.001 that one of the 7.0 million workplaces in the United States will be inspected by OSHA.
(iii) Overregulation causes underregulation The previous theories address OSHA's impact on workplace accidents. Mendeloff (1988) attempts to explain OSHA's limited impact on occupational disease. He identifi es OSHA's mandate as the cause because it requires the strict regulation of toxic substances. The problem is that such 'overregulation' causes 'underregulation'. Overregulation occurs when the costs of a regulation exceed its benefi ts. Underregulation occurs when the costs of additional regulation are less than the benefi ts. Mendeloff argues that strict regulation of toxic substances causes less protection of workers than would the promulgation of regulations that met a cost-benefi t test.
Mendeloff contends strict regulation leads to less protection of workers because employers are more likely to engage in vigorous resistance to overly strict regulations. As a result, OSHA spends inordinate time and resources defending strict standards. If OSHA balanced costs and benefi ts, Mendeloff suggests OSHA could successfully promulgate more standards because regulated entities would be less likely to challenge more lenient regulations in court. Moreover, if more lenient regulations were challenged, OSHA would be more likely to prevail. In this manner, workers ultimately would receive more protection from a more lenient approach. Although each OSHA regulation would be less protective of workers, the sum total of protection for workers would be greater because the agency could promulgate more standards overall.
McGarity and Shapiro (1993) and Shapiro and McGarity (1991) object that employers will oppose even lenient regulations. They off er evidence that employers gain fi nancial benefi ts from delaying even modest health and safety regulations. If the problem is employer intransigence, McGarity and Shapiro propose that Congress change OSHA's statutory mandate to make it easier for OSHA to prevail when it is sued. They also propose reforms to the rulemaking process that would permit OSHA to speed up rulemaking and make it more eff ective, including a revised priority-setting process and adoption of the types of regulations that yield the greatest protection for workers. Mendeloff (1988) proposes that OSHA should balance costs and benefi ts in health regulation because employers would be less likely to challenge more lenient regulation in court. Other analysts, such as Viscusi (1983 Viscusi ( , 1992 , favor adoption of a cost-benefi t standard for OSHA safety and health regulation because this approach is more consistent with economic theory. As related earlier in Section 1.C, economic theory favors a cost-benefi t approach for regulation because it equates the marginal benefi ts of safety and health improvements with the marginal cost of such precautions. More generally, Sunstein (2002a) argues for using cost-benefi t analysis to rationalize all types of safety, health and environmental regulation.
C Reform of standard-setting
McGarity and Shapiro (1993 Shapiro ( , 1996 and Shapiro and McGarity (1991) defend OSHA's approach to standard-setting. Their defense follows the arguments made by Ackerman and Heinzerling (2004) , Shapiro and Glicksman (2003) , Cranor (1993 ), McGarity (1991 and Sagoff (1988) against using cost-benefi t analysis to specify the extent of all types of safety, health and environmental regulation.
Proponents of a cost-benefi t test for OSHA claim OSHA regulations often impose costs that exceed benefi ts, sometimes by hundreds of millions of dollars. For example, Morrall (1979) objected to OSHA's noise regulation because it mandated the use of expensive engineering controls rather than much less expensive personal protection equipment such as ear plugs. Analysts have made similar criticisms of other workplace safety regulation. Similarly, French (1988) suggests that railroad safety regulation in the United States is ineffi cient because excessive burdens are imposed on fi rms. Cost-benefi t opponents deny that it leads to the type of regulatory excesses identifi ed by cost-benefi t supporters. Ackerman and Heinzerling (2004) , for example, argue that evidence backing up claims that safety, health and environmental regulation is ineffi cient is speculative and not empirically sound.
More generally, cost-benefi t opponents claim cost-benefi t analysis is too unreliable to constitute an eff ective method to implement regulations. They point out that because current risk assessment techniques do not permit precise calculations of the number of lives saved or injuries avoided, monetary estimates of benefi ts are likewise imprecise. Furthermore, because the methods used to monetize benefi ts are contestable, opponents note that a cost-benefi t approach ordinarily raises methodological issues that are expensive and time-consuming for agencies to resolve and defend in court. They therefore favor a technology-based approach, such as that used by OSHA, because it more simply establishes industry-wide limitations on the basis of the level of precaution that the best performers in the industry are capable of achieving. Supporters of cost-benefi t analysis, such as Sunstein (2002b) , counter that careful use of the technique can address these limitations and that the methodology is useful and necessary despite the limitations.
Finally, critics charge that use of a cost-benefi t standard as the primary decision criterion eff ectively elevates economic effi ciency to a 'meta-value' that trumps all other confl icting values. McGarity and Shapiro (1993) contend that OSHA's mandate, which refl ects both economic and noneconomic considerations, rejects the idea that the maximization of material wealth is the only goal of a good society. Instead, it seeks to balance 'effi ciency', 'fairness' and other important social values.
D Reform of enforcement
According to Weil (2007) , there are two sets of behavioral assumptions that underlie OSHA's enforcement model. Under a prosecutorial model, employers decide whether to comply with regulations based on the deterrence eff ects of inspections and fi nes. Under the cooperative model, non-compliance arises because employers and employees lack information and guidance about regulatory requirements. Proposals to reform OSHA enforcement practices diff er depending on which model is used. Reforms based on the fi rst model seek to increase the deterrence impact of OSHA inspections and fi nes. Reforms based on the second model employ consultation and education to increase compliance.
(i) Prosecutorial approach The traditional theory assumes that fi rms will act in accordance with the model of compliance originally set out by Becker (1968) , in which regulatory compliance is a function of benefi ts as compared to costs. This means employers will comply with OSHA regulations when it costs less to comply than to risk an adverse OSHA inspection. The risk to an employer of an inspection is a function of the probability that the fi rm will be inspected and the amount of the penalties that OSHA will assess if violations are detected.
In determining whether it is cost-eff ective to comply with administrative regulations, a fi rm may also take into account potential reputational impacts. Fry and Lee (1989) propose that the 'real teeth' of OSHA citations may be the impact on the stock market value of a fi rm. They found that the announcement of fi nes produced an immediate and pronounced decline in the value of the fi rm subject to the penalties. They hypothesize the decline may refl ect the additional costs a fi rm can expect, such as the need to make safety improvements. If the employer's reputation is adversely aff ected, however, there may also be worker turnover, increased demands for wage premiums, or other adverse consequences.
In light of the traditional model, Viscusi (1986a Viscusi ( , 1986b proposes that OSHA should increase the frequency with which it inspects the most dangerous workplaces and that it should assess larger fi nes for serious violations. McGarity and Shapiro (1993) support these recommendations and amplify how they might be implemented. Gray and Mendeloff (2005) urge OSHA to focus inspections on smaller workplaces because their research indicates that smaller worksites are more dangerous than larger ones and because OSHA inspections have a greater impact on reducing the injury rate at smaller fi rms than larger ones. They would also have OSHA inspect non-union worksites more frequently, based on evidence that OSHA inspections appear to have a greater impact on reducing injuries at such worksites than at unionized worksites.
OSHA, however, has a potential problem in targeting inspections. Ruser and Smith (1988) demonstrate that using injury records to target inspections creates an incentive for employers to underreport injuries in high-hazard industries.
(ii) Cooperative model The cooperative model of enforcement rejects the purely economic understanding proposed by Becker. Proponents of this model, such as Bardach and Kagan (1982) , point to research indicating that employers (and other regulated entities) diff er concerning their willingness and capacity to comply with regulations. While some fi rms are 'good apples', who will in good faith attempt to comply with regulations, others are 'bad apples', who will resist compliance solely on the basis that the benefi ts of doing so exceed the costs. Bardach and Kagan recommend that enforcers recognize this distinction and adjust their enforcement approach accordingly. While a prosecutorial approach is appropriate with bad apples, they warn it can backfi re and decrease compliance by good apples, who will respond better to consultation and education eff orts. They, along with Howard (1994) criticize OSHA for zealously enforcing detailed rules in circumstances where enforcement is counterproductive, unfair or even nonsensical.
More recently, Lobel (2005) contends that OSHA should adopt a framework of administrative governance which integrates cooperative public and private eff orts to promote occupational safety and health. This adjustment is necessary because there are clear limitations to traditional enforcement methods including, most importantly, that fi rms have motivations that go beyond costs and monetary incentives in determining their compliance and resistance to occupational safety standards and enforcement. To be more eff ective, OSHA therefore needs to understand these motivations and incentives and build cooperative programs that take advantage of them.
Using survey evidence, Vickers et al. (2005) fi nd small business fi rms in Great Britain have a limited understanding of occupational safety and health regulatory requirements. Their evidence also suggests a complex set of internal and external factors leads fi rms to diff er substantially in the priority they accord to health and safety and in their responsiveness to statutory legal requirements. The article proposes a typology of business attitudes involving fi ve categories that is more nuanced than the good apple versus bad apple categories discussed earlier.
Lobel (2005) and others endorse joint employer-employee health and safety committees as a new governance reform. These committees, which are responsible for monitoring workplace conditions, can improve safety by focusing the attention of employers and employees on workplace hazards and by providing a forum for the exchange of information. The committees can also give workers a voice concerning safety issues in non-unionized workplaces. According to Finkin (2002) , a dozen states have laws requiring employers to establish employer-employee health and safety committees. Rea (1983) discusses Canadian laws that require such committees. He notes that because joint safety committees were already in existence in larger unionized establishments, the main impact of the legislation has been to extend the practice to small fi rms and non-unionized workplaces. Walters and Haines (1988) fi nd, however, that workers in Ontario have only weak links with their health and safety representatives and few workers made use of this resource. Rabinowitz and Hager (2000) fi nd that Canada, in comparison to the United States, provides employees with substantially enhanced rights to participate in safety and health decision-making and to refuse unsafe work. They conclude that such enhanced employee rights are necessary adjuncts to cooperation and consensus in safety and health regulation and enforcement. McGarity and Shapiro (1993) support similar reforms for the United States. Weil (2007) indicates that his research demonstrates that workers are more likely to exercise their legal rights when they have an agent that assists them which, in most cases, is a union. Gunningham and Johnstone (2000) propose another type of new governance reform -a 'two track' regulatory system that off ers fi rms a choice of traditional forms of regulation or the adoption of safety management systems (SMS). In traditional enforcement, regulators determine whether a fi rm has complied with regulatory standards. In an SMS approach, regulators determine whether a company has established an appropriate safety management system and whether it has eff ective internal controls to ensure internal compliance with that system. One advantage of the SMS alternative is that it permits employers to fi ne-tune safety systems to fi t their particular situations. In return, the regulatory agency can ask for higher levels of safety than required by existing regulations. Estlund (2005) doubts that American workers can be eff ective advocates for their interests in administrative governance types of programs due to the low rate of unionization in the United States and the lack of other eff ective legal protections. Her proposed solution, 'monitored self-regulation', employs independent monitors who would oversee self-regulatory programs and safeguard their integrity. Estlund contends auditors can give a voice to employees and create market pressure on fi rms to live up to their commitments by releasing public reports. Gunningham and Johnstone (2000) discuss the use of third-party monitors to audit fi rms using SMS in a two-track regulatory system. Lobel (2005) distinguishes administrative governance with its more cooperative elements from cooperative policies that are a political coverup for deregulation. Similarly, Shapiro and Rabinowitz (1997) warn that excessive reliance on cooperation is likely to undermine compliance because, while employers may prefer cooperative policies, voluntary cooperation will break down if fi rms in compliance with OSHA standards must compete with fi rms who use voluntary cooperation as a way of avoiding compliance. Brown (1994) claims that regulators in British Columbia have relied too heavily on a cooperative approach. He cites statistics indicating that most employers were not punished for regulatory violations, a signifi cant percentage of them committed repeat violations of the same regulation previously violated, often multiple times, and this pattern held for both high risk and less serious violations. Shapiro and Rabinowitz (2000) also express skepticism about the eff ectiveness of cooperative policies based on evidence of the impact of such programs in workplace and environmental contexts. They acknowledge the potential of cooperative approaches to induce greater protection than relying solely on prosecutorial methods, but fi nd that such approaches only work in narrowly circumscribed circumstances and, in these contexts, provide for less protection than traditional enforcement. Baggs et al. (2003) report that they were unable to fi nd an association between consultation activities and a decrease in workers' compensation rates in their study of employers in the state of Washington.
By comparison, Scholz and Gray (1997) fi nd evidence that cooperation works to reduce injury rates. Testing the impact of OSHA inspections that did not impose a sanction on 6800 plants, they found that complaint inspections that provided information were followed by a decrease in injury rates in the fi rst (2.6 per cent) and second years (5.5 per cent), while inspections that did not provide information were followed by an increase in injury rates in the second year (3.4 per cent) and overall (3.3 per cent). Although inspections imposing penalties produced a greater decline in injury rates in the fi rst (6.9 per cent) and second (5.7 per cent) years following an inspection, Scholtz and Grey conclude their study indicates the effi cacy of cooperative methods of enforcement.
Conclusions
Occupational safety and health regulation is justifi ed, according to economic theory, if labor markets fail to produce fully compensating wage premiums for employees who face occupational safety and health risks. Wage premiums have been empirically verifi ed, but it is probable that workers are not fully compensated for accident and diseases risks after taking into account workers' compensation. Government action that provides workers with more and better information about these risks should prompt workers to seek more adequate compensation.
There is mixed evidence as to whether OSHA regulation is eff ective in reducing workplace injuries and there is disagreement about why OSHA has not been more eff ective. One explanation is that there is a tenuous link between regulation and the causes of accidents, another is that OSHA lacks suffi cient resources to enforce its regulations eff ectively, and a third is that OSHA's failure to follow a cost-benefi t test encourages employer intransigence.
The discussion of standard-setting reform in the literature centers on whether OSHA should adhere to a cost-benefi t test. This approach would be consistent with economic theory, but it is opposed, among other reasons, because cost-benefi t analysis is too unreliable to constitute an eff ective method to implement regulations and because economic effi ciency should not be the only normative value that administrative regulation pursues. There is also a debate as to whether OSHA regulations are as highly ineffi cient as OSHA's critics claim.
The discussion in the literature concerning reform of enforcement proceeds on two tracks. Based on a prosecutorial model, reformers urge OSHA to maximize the impact of its inspections and fi nes by better targeting of employers with poor safety and health records. Based on a cooperative model, reformers urge OSHA to engage in information and educational eff orts that integrate the agency, employers and employees in joint eff orts to promote occupational safety and health, such as employeremployee health and safety committees. Although there is agreement that such eff orts can be eff ective, there is disagreement regarding in what circumstances a cooperative approach will be more eff ective than a prosecutorial approach.
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